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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
dent for allowing the appeal in the instant case was, in a later case,13 used
to illustrate the proposition that the Court recognizes as a legal interest
"the legitimate interest of public officials and administrative commissions,
federal and state, to resist the endeavor to prevent the enforcement of
statutes in relation to which they have official duties."' 4 Yet, in the instant
case, respondent was not an official charged with the enforcement of any
law; it was merely a private person who might suffer financial injury.
The real basis for the Court's holding, and the real significance of this
extension of the doctrine of legal interest, is probably to be found in that
portion of the original opinion deleted by the Court when it denied the
Commission a rehearing: 15 "In this view, while the injury to such person
would not be the subject of redress, the person might be the instrument,
upon an appeal, of redressing an injury to the public service which would
otherwise remain without remedy." 16 This novel basis for allowing an
appeal from an administrative agency when the term "person aggrieved"
is used in the governing statute may prove to be of great importance. Other
statutes contain the term and future legislation may incorporate it.27
T. B.
AGENCY-SCOPE or EMPLOYMENT-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR NEGLI-
GENCE OF AGENT COMMANDEERED BY PoLICF--[District of Columbia].-The
driver of defendant's truck was commandeered by a policeman to chase a
traffic violator, and, while driving under the officer's direction, negligently
injured plaintiff. Held, one judge dissenting, that the principal was not
liable for its agent's negligence, since the agent was acting outside the scope
of his employment. Balinovic v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.j
The case is interesting as an expression of two different philosophies,
both somewhat obscured by the legal verbiage "scope of employment." This
term stands for a legal concept which is stretched, on occasion, to cover
situations in which the court, for reasons of policy, feels that the principal
should bear the loss.' Thus, the principal has been held liable in numerous
13. Coleman v. Miller (1938) 307 U. S. 433.
14. Id. at 442.
15. See 8 U. S. L. Week (1940) 668 (rehearing denied and opinion
amended).
16. Federal Communications Comm. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station
(1940) 60 S. Ct. 693, 698 (italics supplied).
17. E. g.: Bituminous Coal Act (1937) 50 Stat. 85, c. 127, sec. 6 (b),
15 U. S. C. A. (1939) sec. 836 (b) ; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 1065, sec. 10 (a), 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1939) sec. 210.
1. (App. D. C. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 505.
2. See Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 349,
356, where the court stated: "But few doctrines of the law are more firmly
established or more in harmony with notions of social policy than that of
the liability of the principal without fault of his own." In Robards v.
Bannon Sewer Pipe Co. (1908) 130 Ky. 380, 387, 113 S. W. 429, 18 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 923, 132 Am. St. Rep. 394, the court said that the law will not
"undertake to make any nice distinctions, fixing with precision the line
that separates the act of the servant from the act of the individual. When
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cases where the agent was acting in violation of his agency, and even
where the agent's act constituted a crime.4
In the instant case, the problem centers around the question of whether
the doctrine of "scope of employment" should be expanded to cover the case
of a principal whose agent has been commandeered to aid in law enforce-
ment. There are arguments of policy available on both sides of the issue.
The majority of the court refused to take the position that it should be so
expanded, whereas Judge Rutledge, dissenting, felt that it should be, and
that liability arose because the agent was discharging a duty imposed by
law upon the defendant as an obligation owed to the community by a
corporate citizen. 5 The basis for this argument is that a citizen owes a
duty to aid in law enforcement,6 and that an individual would be liable for
his own negligence in executing this duty.7 A corporation owes the same
dities to the community as an individual,$ but unlike the individual, it must
fulfill these personal obligations through its agents. Consequently, situations
may arise where the agent is fulfilling a duty personal to his corporate
principal. Then the latter should be liable.
Judge Rutledge points out that the burden which industry would have
to bear would not be great, since such accidents are rare. Moreover, the
principal is generally in a position to transfer the cost to the community.
If we assume that by reason of this accident the innocent victim might, if
unrecompensed, become a burden upon the community, the community would
thus bear the burden in any event.9 In a workmen's compensation proceed-
there is doubt, it will be resolved against the master, upon the ground that
he set in motion the servant who committed the wrong." In Higgins v.
Watervliet Turnpike Co. (1871) 46 N. Y. 23, 26, 7 Am. Rep. 293, the court
said: "In most cases where the master has been held liable for the negli-
gence of his servant, not only was there an absence of authority to commit
the wrong, but it was committed in violation of the duty which the servant
owed to the master."
3. Robards v. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co. (1908) 130 Ky. 380, 113 S. W.
429, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923, 132 Am. St. Rep. 394; Higgins v. Watervliet
Turnpike Co. (1871) 46 N. Y. 23, 7 Am. Rep. 293. See 2 Mechem, Agency
(2d ed. 1914) 1462, 1468, sees. 1881, 1882.
4. Panama R. Co. v. Toppin (1920) 252 U. S. 308; Great Southern Lum-
ber Co. v. Williams (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 17 F. (2d) 468; Stinson v.
Prevatt (1922) 84 Fla. 416, 94 So. 656; Coleman v. Nail (1934) 49 Ga.
App. 51, 174 S. E. 178; McMillen v. Steele (1923) 275 Pa. 584, 119 Atl.
721; Davis v. Merrill (1922) 133 Va. 69, 112 S. E. 628.
5. Balinovic v. Evening Star Newspaper Co. (App. D. C. 1940) 113 F.
(2d) 505, 507, citing Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp. (1928) 250 N. Y. 14,
164 N. E. 726, 61 A. L. R. 1354.
6. Dougherty v. State (1895) 106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393; Firestone v. Rice
(1888) 71 Mich. 377, 38 N. W. 885, 15 Am. St. Rep. 266; Coyles v. Hurtin
(N. Y. 1815) 10 Johns. 85; McMahan v. Green (1861) 34 Vt. 69, 80 Am.
Dec. 665. That the duty is historical and statutory, see Babington v.
Yellow Taxi Corp. (1928) 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726, 61 A. L. R. 1354.
7. Jones v. Melvin (1936) 293 Mass. 9, 199 N. E. 392.
8. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp. (1928) 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726,
61 A. L. R. 1354.
9. Assuming that the agent and the policeman are judgment proof, the
only possible recovery would be against the municipality, which is exempt
by law.
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ceeding involving similar facts, this question of policy was decided in favor
of the injured person.' 0 There, however, the question arose under a statute
whose whole philosophy indicated rather clearly the line of policy to be
followed in doubtful cases, and which the court was compelled by tradition
to interpret liberally. Perhaps in the instant case the court was correct in
refusing to hold the principal liable by extending further the concept of
scope of employment. Action to that end could better be taken by the
legislature. In the jurisdiction of the principal case the legislature took
action tending toward that result while the case was in litigation, passing
a statute which imposes liability on the owner of a car for the act of any
person who drives it with his consent."
V. M.
APPELLATE PRACTICE-JURISDICTIONAL AmIOUNT-INVESTMENT OF TRUST
ESTATE FUNDS-[Missouri].-The life beneficiary of a trust estate requested
the trustee under a will to invest $8,000 of the trust estate in preferred and
common stock, and $8,000 in a common trust fund. It was intended thereby
to increase the income from the trust estate by about $200 a year. The
estate was, at the time, invested wholly in corporate bonds worth $38,000.
The remaindermen of the trust estate contested the trustee's authority under
the will to make the proposed change of investments. The circuit court held
that the trustee did possess such power. An appeal was taken to the
supreme court, both parties tacitly assuming that the appeal would lie,
since the estate exceeded $7,500. Held, that the supreme court did not have
jurisdiction, because the amount in dispute was insufficient; that, since the
relief demanded was not primarily a money judgment but merely a deter-
mination of the trustee's right to make particular investments, the amount
in dispute was to be determined by the value in money of relief to the
plaintiff. Under this ruling, the contemplated increase in annual income
would determine the amount in dispute, and it clearly did not exceed $7,500.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Toberman.1
The broad rule adhered to by the court in reaching this decision is that
jurisdiction attaches when, and only when, the record of the trial court
affirmatively shows that there is involved an amount in controversy, inde-
pendent of all contingencies, exceeding $7,500.2 It was under this rule that
the court held that where there is involved no divestiture of the title of a
trust estate, the value of the entire estate does not determine jurisdiction.
10. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp. (1928) 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726,
61 A. L. R. 1354. But cf. Kennelly v. Salt & Lumber Co. (1916) 190 Mich.
629, 157 N. W. 378 (employee ordered by fire-warden to assist in extin-
guishing forest fire).
11. D. C. Code (Supp. V, 1939) tit. 6, sec. 255b. The statute would not,
necessarily, apply to the facts of the principal case. Was the agent driving
with the principal's consent after his services had been impressed by the
police officer?
1. (Mo. 1939) 134 S. W. (2d) 45.
2. Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co. (1937) 340 Mo. 721, 102 S. W. (2d) 592.
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